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In the last twenty-five years there has been a significant change in the way political communities deal with their past. A "national" policy of remembrance, which highlights the heroic deeds of its members, commemoratesitsownvictimsandcrimesinflictedbyotherentities,andforgetsaboutcrimescommittedinthenameofone'sowncommunityseemstobereplacedbya"post-national"policyofremebrance. Inseveralcountriesdealingwiththedarksidesofone'shistoryhasbecomeasignificanttoposwithina policy of remembrance and cultural commemoration. In contrast, a country like Russia refuses to step intothisprocessofestablishinganewpost-nationalrégimed'historicitéandreferstohistoryonlyinor-dertostrengthenitsnationalidentity:WhilerememberingitseffortindefeatingGermanyinthe"Great FatherlandWar,"RussiansocietyforgetsaboutthetraumaoftheGulagandcrimescommittedinitsname in other former states of the Soviet Union. My paper argues that the specific setting of Russia's official policy of remembrance is due to the notion of a society of heroes once forcibly institutionalized as the constitutive historiographical principle by Stalin's regime. Regarding to the discourse in the field of memory such a forced interconnection between historiography and memory could be characterized as »occupiedmemory«.AlthoughRussia'sofficialpolicyofremembrancepassedthroughseveralquitedifferentphases,nowadays,however,acriticalapproachtoRussia'spasthasbeenreplacedbya"patriotic consensus"thatexpressesanew-orbetter-anoldRussianconceptofidentity.
I.Introduction
There is a deep connection between WWII, the Great Fatherland War, as the Russians refer toit,andtheGulagArchipelagointhememoryof Russia. 1 Solzhenitsynseemstohavethisconnection in mind when he refers to a Russian saying intheprologofhisbookonthe"GULagArchipelago." The first part of this Russian say-ing says: "Nodon't!Don'tdigupthepast!Dwellonthepast and you'll lose an eye" (Solzhenitsyn, 1985, pp. xvi) .
InwhatfollowsIwilltrytoexplainwhythe "wayofremembering"WWIIandmisrememberingthemasscrimesandvictimsoftheGulagare directly connected with one another. What is meantby"wayofremembering?"Theexperences ofWWIIforRussiaare,asMariaFerrettiputsit, "tragic ambivalent" (Ferretti, 2005, pp. 47) . It is strikingthattheofficialremembranceofWWIIis possibleonlyintheframeworkofaheroicstory.
1 Gulag is both, an acronym for Glavnoje Upravlenije Ispravitelnotrudovych Lagerej i kolonij which means the "Chief Administration of Corrective Labor Camps and Colonies" and a synonym for the Soviet system of repression existing of forced labor camps, penal camps, prisonsetc.Althoughcampshadexistedinthetsarempire and under Lenin's regime as well, the quality of those camps changed in 1929 when Stalin came to power. The number of people who died in the Gulag differ tremendously from source to source. However, it is estimated todaythataround20Millionpeoplewerekilledordiedin thesecampsbetween1929and1953(Stalin'sdeath).
NeitheristherespaceforeventslikeKatyn, 2 the fearofdeathofthesoldiers,Stalin'sinhumanmilitary commands, nor is there a chance to interpret the war itself in another framework. The situationofthefrontoviki(guerillas),forinstance, could also be interpreted in terms of free selfdetermination rather than unquestioned military obedience and trust in the unlimited capability of the military leader. Anyhow, that's not the case in Russia. I will argue that the way of dealingwithWWIIontheonehandandtheGulag on the other can be explained by the role and function they are playing within the context of Russianculturalmemory.
Inordertoexplicatethisroleandfunction,I will refer to the theoretical debates on memory andhistory,andelaborateonthestructuraldifference between a democratic culture of comm.-emoration and a totalitarian one. What is characteristic for a totalitarian culture of commemorationisaso-called"occupiedmemory" (Arnold, 1998,pp.18) .AfterwardsIwillelucidatethatthe specificsettingofRussia'sofficialpolicyofremembranceisduetothenotionofasocietyofheroes once forcibly institutionalized as the constitutivehistoriographicalprinciplebyStalin'sregime. Although Russia's official policy of remem-2 KatynisasynonymforthekillingofthousandsofPolish militaryofficers,Polishpolicemen,intellectualsandcivilian prisoners by the Soviet secret police (NKVD) in the early 1940sinaforestclosetotheRussiancityKatyn.In1990, Mikhail Gorbachev for the first time formally expressed profound regret and admitted Soviet secret police responsibility brance passed through several quite different phases,however,thereisneitherroomformourning,contemplation,norreflectionforthevictimsoftheregime.
II.Memory,historiographicaliterationsand thetotalitarianstate Remembrance,pastormemoryareanything butclearandeasyconcepts;theyareambivalent and difficult to deal with. Properly speaking, neithermemorynor"thepast"existperse.Memory,remembrance,or"thepast"areresultsofan ongoing, conscious, or unconscious proc-ess of narrative construction which is initiated, guided orperhapsevencontrolledbyvariousactorsand multipliers.Moreover,thereareatleastasmany different designs of memory or remembrance as individuals living in one society. Nevertheless, onecouldspeakofsomethinglike"collectivememory" in order to express similar or even congruent approaches towards the past which could beidentifiedwithinasociety.
The philosophical discussion about this social dimension of memory starts with Nietzsche. In the On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche maintained that it is the process of memory-formation that enables an individual to overcome the pure subjectivity of his or her own interests andtoenterintosocialcommitments (Nietzsche, 1972a) .Morethanfiftyyearslater,inhisstudies onthesocialdimensionofmemory,MauriceHalbwachsrevealedhowindividualmemoryisconstitutedthroughcommunicationwithothermembers of society and by belonging to a certain group, such as family or neighborhood. It was Halbwachswhointroducedtheconceptofcollectivememoryanddefineditasasharedaccountof thepastbyagroupofpeople(Halbwachs1992). However, for Halbwachs, the collective memory of a certain group was bound in space and time. Byreleasingmemoryfromthesetiesbymeansof symbolsandculturalmolding,PierreNoraenhancedthetheoryofmemory.Theideaofanation asanabstractcommunitydefiningitsself-perceptionbytranscendingtimeandspacewithsymbolsandculturalcodesisrootedatthecoreofNora's thinking on memory (Nora, 1990) . In his studieson"culturalmemory,"JanAssmannspecifies the idea of memory and replaces the mystic term"collectivememory"byamorepreciseconcept: for Assmann there are two different types of memory within a community -"communicative"and"culturalmemory."While"communicative memory" is fairly un-organized, unstructured and formed by communication of every day life situations, cultural memory is distant from everydaylifeandisconstitutedbyculturalmolding -such as texts, rites, or memorials, as well asinstitutionalizedcommunicationsuchasrecitation, solemnization, or contemplation. The selfperceptionofanation,forAssmann,derivesfrom the content of its cultural memory (Assmann, 1988; Assmann,1995) .
However,PierreNoramaintainsthatremembrance also works by projecting, by tuning out, byrepressingoneaspectforthesakeofanother. Inshort:theway"culturalmemory"workscould be far from being "objective," from serving justice. Aleida Assmann refers to this problem by distinguishing the concept of memory into the specialtasksmemorycouldper-form:Ontheone hand, Aleida Assmann mentions the "functional memory" or "inhabited memory" (Assmann & Aleida,1995) .Thiskindofmemoryislinkedtoa special group or institution and is concerned withthecreationofmeaningaswellaswithguiding the process of identity-formation for a certain community. "Functional memory" is quite selectiveinchoosingaspectsofthepastasworth remembering: Only those aspects of history are taken into account, which are crucial for the creation of meaning. "Functional memory" ignoresallthoseeventswhicharelessornotimportant or sometimes even dangerous for the selfunder-standing of a community. The job of the "functional memory" is to convey values, which canhelptodesignacommunity,tosustainidentity,andtoprovidenormsforacting.Ontheother handAleidaAssmannintroducestheterm"uninhabited memory" or "storage memory." "Storage memory"radicallyseparatesbetweenpast,present,andfutureandignoresallnormsandvalues. AleidaAssmannspeaksofthiskindofmemoryas a"stuffedanddustystoreroom,"asa"memoryof memories,"(Assmann&Aleida,1995)orusesthe metaphorofa"historicalarchive." Thishistoricalarchivestoresinformationfor the use of specialists. An archive is not a museum; it is not designed for public access and popular presentations. It differs from what is publicly exposed in the same way that great museumshowsdifferfromarrayofobjectsinthe stuffed storerooms in the subterranean tracts of museums. There is, of course, some order and arrangement [...] too, but it is one that ensures onlytheretrievalofinformation,notanintellectually or emotionally effective display. The archive,inotherwords,isnotaformofpresentation butofpreservation;itcollectsandstoresinformation, it does not arrange, exhibit, process, or interpretit." (Assmann&Aleida,2006,pp.270 By linking "functional memory" with "storage memory," the creation of meaning and the formationofidentityisnotcompletelydissolved from a rational discourse. To be more precise: on the one hand there is open discourse which is first and foremost concerned with the questionofhistorical"truth"oramoreadequatepresentationandperceptionofhistoricalevents.On theotherhand,linkingthecreationofmea-ning and formation of identity with historiography provides the justified possibility that the "culturalmemory"ofacommunityisabletochange.
Tosumup:Incommunities,forinstance,in modern democracies, with a critical historiography-withanopenandcontroversialdiscourseonhistory(oratleastthepossibilitytoit),withaprocessonecoulddescribeaccordingtoSeyla Benhabib as "historiographical iterations" 3 where "principles and norms are reappropriated and reiterated" (Benhabib, 2004, pp. 113) by all participants in the discourse on history andthepast-mythologisationofthepastcould be prevented. In such communities the process of identity-formation and self-perception can onlybeproceedonthegroundofdiscussionwithandinchallengebythediscourse,whichista-kingplaceinhistoriographyandallhistoricalsciencesrespectively.
Since in the Soviet Union historiography was guided by anything but an open discourse, SabineArnold,followingAleidaAssmann,characterizes the memory in totalitarian states as an "occupied memory" (Arnold, 1998, pp. 18 ). The conceptof"occupiedmemory"referstotherepressiveandmanipulatingcontrolofthepro-cess of memory-formation by state authorities. In totalitarian states the purpose of history is to embedthepresentcommunityinalong,mighty, honorable and glorious tradition, which should bindthemembersofthecommunitytothistradition.Historicaleventswhichsupportthispurpose are conserved by cultural molding and a policyofremembrance;whilethoseeventsdisturbing the designated image of memory of the totalitarianstateareremovedanddestructedby revised history. In Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt gives an illuminating example fortherevisedhistoryoftotalitarianstateswhen she points to the power it takes to rewrite the history of the Russian Revolution in such a waythatintheend"nomanbythenameofTrotsky was ever commander-in-chief of the Red Army" (Arendt,1994,pp.356) .
By means of a manipulative approach towardshistoryeverymemberofthecommunityis forcedtofollowacertainsetofnormsofaction; normswhichdetermineeachmember'splacein thecommunity.Thedifferencebetweenstorage andrevisionontheonehandandidentity-formation and creation of meaning is dissolved in caseofanoccupiedmemory.Theaccesstoarchives is restricted or prohibited. Under these circumstances historiography is just producing myths for the sake of a certain not-ion of identityinsteadofunderminingthem.
In the Soviet Union, under Stalin's command,historiographybecameameanstoestablish a certain notion of identity upon the community. Due to the amalgamation of historiography and memory in the totalitarian Soviet Union,itispossiblebyunfoldingthoseprincples on which identity should be created and which historiographyhastoobey,todisclosethelogic ofthecultureofcommemoration.
III.DeterminingHistoriography A close look at Stalinist historiography reveals the above-mentioned occupation of memory.Thefundamentalrearrangementofthewayof teachinghistoryatschoolaswellasthereopen-ing of the departments of history relies on a resolutionoftheCommunistPartyoftheSoviet Union(CPSU) from 15 March 1934. Due to this resolution the idea of Marxism-Leninism was more or less replaced by a patriotic reorientation: the concept of "soviet patriotism" was established as an ideological principle of historiography,therefore,itbecamethedutyofevery historian and each person who deals with matters of historical interests to interpret the pastinsuchawaythatthepatrioticfeelingsand emotions were encouraged, that it showed the heroic tradition every member of the present communityisembeddedandthatpositivevalues and norms could be derived from former historicalevents.Ifatall,thescientificstandard wasofsecondaryimportance (Geyer,1985) .
Due to this reform the so-called "Fatherlands history" covers the history of all nations andpeoplewhohaveeverlivedontheterritory oftheSovietUnionandtracesbacktotheoldest times. However, since Russia and its history is abrogated in the history of the Soviet Union, thereisnohistoryofRussiawithinthescopeof the "Fatherland history" at all -as a history of the Ukraine, for example, is. To sum up, the "Fatherlandshistory"orthehistoryoftheSoviet Union meant nothing else than historiography in continuity with the Russian empire. The history of all non-Russian peoples and communities of the Soviet Union appears as a mere attachmenttothe"greattradition"ofRussia.
However, placing the Soviet Union in the tradition of the Russian empire helps to establishoneethnicparadigmatthegroundofhistoriography: narodnost. The idea of narodnost, whichmeansasetofvaluesandnormscharacterizingtheethnic-nationalcustomsandethnicnational culture of Russia could be regarded as the heart of Russian nationalism. Narodnost, as Renner puts it, is the summation of all nongovernmental attributes of the nation. In the 19 th centurytheso-called"Slavophiles"opposed narodnost to the western ideal of individualism ontheonehandandtothenotionofpatriotism given by tsar empire on the other. One out of manyimportantaspectsoftheguidingprinciple of society is the concept sobornost. Sobornost expresses a strong feeling of "togetherness" or "integrality."ThetermwascoinedbySlavophiles to underline the need for cooperation between people at the expense of the western idea of individualism. Supplmented by the principle of celostnost,whichstandsfortheideaofthinking and feeling in holistic terms, both aspects of narodnost express the culture of consent of a rural-patriarchic Russia. Cultural autonomy (samobytnost) and the need to bec-ome a great power(dseriawa)arefurthercruci-alaspectsof narodnost (Renner, 2000) . Both ref-er to the mythof"Moscowasthe3 rd Rome"whi-chdeals with the legitimacy for this claim to be or to become a super power. Obedience to authorities(samoderzavie)isanotheraspectofnaro dnost.Withoutastronggovernmentorpolitical leader,asSimonputit,theRussianstatesprovedtobeunabletogovernRussiansociety(Simon,1995).
Withallmeansofculturalmolding(historiography, history lessons, monuments etc.), Stalin's regime established narodnost as the guidingprincipleofhistoriography-aprinciple whichreflectsthehistoricalrealityofthesocial organizationofRussiaontheonehandandhelpstostructuretheculturalmemoryofthecountryfordecadesontheother.Sincehistoriography was degenerated to a means of identityformation and creation of meaning examining theideaofnarodnostgivesanadequateillustration of the soviet culture of commemoration: state-worshipping,anti-individualism,obedence to authorities, and nationalism. Although Stalin's regime was able to establish structures in cultural memory which support their claim for domination the question remains with what kindofcontentthesestructuresshouldbefilled with?Inotherwords,howcouldsocialcohesion beprovided?
IV.Boundbyasocietyofheroes In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution thepoliticalleadersfacedthequestionofhowto motivate the people to join the project of Russia'ssocialreorganization?MaximGorkyseems to give an adequate answer with his comments on heroes symbolized by the proleletariat. This notion of a hero which is, as Guenther puts it "an indispensable element of every totalitarian culture" (Guenther, 1993, pp. 7) combines all appealing and aggressive energy whichwasregardedtobenecessarytomobilize the masses of people. Influenced by Nietzsche's superman,theRussianfolkloremovement,Marx andthe"literaryromantic,"Gorkycharacterizes thenewRussianmanasaself-sacrificingfighter for a better world -a man acting only for the sakeofthecommunityandbydoingsoemancipatinghimself (Guenther,1994) .
By establishing the canon of values of socialist realism as the aesthetic paradigm for literature, art, and culture at the beginning of the 1930s, Soviet regime was able to produce heroesadlibitum.Moreover,theregimecouldcharacterizetheseheroesinsuchawaythattheyfit into the political efforts and requirements they wanttoaccomplish.Since1934theSoviethero cultwasinstitutionalizedsystematically.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of establishing the hero cult in society the political instrumentalization of the Second World War has been paramount. WWII, the Great Fatherland War,notonlymarksthetake-offofthispolitical instrumentalization, but the remembrance of deadsoldiersinparticularandWWIIingeneral undoubtedly crown the approach of hero-worshiping, too. With their deaths the soldiers lost theirindividualcharactersandwerestylizedintosupra-individualheroicpersonswholosttheir lives relying upon the unlimited capability of themilitaryleader,thefutureoftheSovietUnion,thevaluesitrepresents,anditsculturalsupremacy.Althoughthesoldiersbecamethemost significant subject of the soviet hero myth, my few remarks have already shown that this illustrationofthesoldiersfitintothestructureof the cultural memory designed by Stalinist historiography. Events and facts like the Hitler/Stalin-pact,thekillingofthepolishofficersin Katyn,thefearofdeathofthesoldiers,thebrutalization in war, the lousy military equipment, the lack of food, and innumerable suicide squads,donotmaketheirwayintoRussianhistoriography.
Althoughthewayofdealingwiththesoldiers in the context of hero-worshipping slightly changed in the aftermath of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party where mass-heroism was initially propagated, WWII still holds the highestrankinthesovietconceptionofhistory. Friedrich Kuebart for example outlines to what extentthe20thanniversaryoftheSovietvictory caused an enormous stir of patriotic activityespecially for pupils and young people. Field tripstobattlefieldsandvisitingformersoldiers oftheRedArmyallowedkidsandyoungpeople to familiarize with the fundamental historical impact of the Great Fatherland War and its deeper meaning for the history of the Soviet Union.Almosteveryschoolbecameasponsorof a former soldier who was invited to give a talk andtellhisstoryonofficialRemembranceDays. However, mourning, contemplation, and reflection were suppressed by the demand of strength, optimism, obedience and the fulfillment of duty (Kuebart,1967) .Again,theherocultdeals asthecrucialmeans.Especiallyintheaftermath ofthe20 th CongressoftheCommunistParty,the foundation of veteran's organizations was pushedforward.Firstly,commemoratingshouldbe organized on a broader scale. Secondly, Khrushchev'sregimewantedtoenhancethestatusof the masses at the expense of Stalin. Mass-heroismgainedaccessintoeverydaylife:shiftworking became as heroic as holding a volunteer position. In return for their "heroic deeds" workers were pictured in administrative facilities, schoolsanduniversities,factoriesandevennext to highways. In the Soviet Union heroic deeds belong to everyday life. Of course, propagating mass heroism became possible because of the economicprosperityof1960sand1970s.However, conveyed by all kinds of means of education and propaganda, as Sabine Arnold puts it, the hero cult framed the individual and collectiveself-consciousnessofthreegenerations.
Since Marxian terminology was far from beingsufficienttomobilizesociety,Gorky'shero myth deals as the "decisive promoter of consciousness-building" (Arnold, 1998, pp. 9 ) in order to internalize and repeat patriotic emotions, fe-elings and meaningful identities. The "agitation to happiness" (Guenther, 1994) was based upon concepts such as loyalty, nationhood,theFatherland,homeland,mold,or bloodbondwhichwereformedtoaconglomerateofnorms-formedbyaterminologywhichis more accessible than a Marxian terminology (Geyer, .Stylizedtoheroesthesoldiersof WWII easily and accessibly incorporate loyalties,emotionsandproceduresdemandedbythe regime. The soldiers of WWII represented the prototype of the homo sovieticus, as Ignatow maintains, and additionally they show a remarkable simil-arity with the ideal of the traditionalRussianman (Ignatow,1999) .
Tosummarize,theculturalmemory-which wasan"occupiedmemory"-wasdeterminedin twoways:ontheonehand,byestablishingnar odnostastheguidingprincipleofhistoriography Stalin's regime structures the cultural memory inahierarchicalwaythatmaintainsthecultural and historical supremacy of Russia, as well as the duty that everybody has to subordinate his life to the needs of the nation and the cohesion of the country. From this follows that remembrance of WWII is only possible in terms of obedience, belief in the political leaders and authoritiesandsacrificingoneselfforthesakeof Russia. Remembering the experience of the guerillas,forinstance,intermsofcreativity,free thinkers who disobey senseless commands and who arrange their way of living and surviving separated from the "helpful" control of the military leaders did not and does not fit into the hierarchicalstructureofRussia'sculturalmemory.Ontheotherhand,theremembranceofthe soldiers not only had to follow a certain structure;italsohadtofulfillanemotionalpurpose: as heroes the soldiers should represent all the necessary values such as strength, optimism, pure hearts of patriotism, undaunted by death, andsoon.TheGreatFatherlandWarshouldsymbolizealltheattitudeswhicharenecessaryto build up a glorious future of the Soviet Union (Plaggenborg, 2001 ). Due to the special setting ofthecontenttherewasnospaceformourning, tears and trauma in the cultural memory of Russia. In short: Historiography of the Soviet Union combined a hierarchical structure with value-formatting and emotional substance: the heromyth.
V.TheGulagandthe"Holesofoblivion" ButwherearethevictimsoftheGulag-the victims of Stalinism? In what follows I will give twodifferentanswerstothisquestion:thefirst answer is directly linked to the status of WWII intheculturalmemoryofRussiaandthenotion of a society of heroes. For the second answer, I will follow Dan Diner and point to the special settingandarrangementoftheGulagasamass crime.However,IwillshowhowthesetwodifferentapproachestothequestionofmisrememberingtheGulagcouldbelinkedtogethertoday.
The existence of the Gulag does not fit into thepictureofsocietyofheroesatall.Ijustwant togiveonebriefbutilluminativeexample-but of course there are many since every form of domination needs some support by the people; otherwise it could not exist for years. The example comes from Hannah Arendt. Again, in the OriginsofTotalitarianismArendtmaintainsthat denouncing friends became a crucial mean to confirm ones loyalty with the regime. Moreover, denouncing somebody provides circumstantial evidence which brings an accusation of non-existent crimes (Arendt, 1994) . Due to this shameful cooperation between the regime and the people the heroic deeds of the Great Fatherland War seem to be more pleasant to remember. Beyond official policy undoubtedly it is morepleasanttorem-embertheheroicdeedsof defeatingNazi-GermanyintheGreatFatherland Warandtojointheprojectofbuildingup"true socialism" than flipping the dark chapter of the Gulagopenandfacingone'sownpossibleresponsibility. In 1885, Nietzsche had already pointed to this kind of mechanism in Beyond good and evil: "'I have done that' says my memory. I could not have done that -says my pride and remains implacable. Finally, my memory gives up" (Nietzsche,1972b,pp.71) .
However, by comparing letters of former soldiers with the interviews they gave many yearslater,SabineArnoldelaboratesthatmemory-atleasttheindividualone-isabletogive uponlytoacertainextent.Whilereportingfrom war situations the soldiers' remembrances are sweptawayandrepressedbyofficialgildedmemories and their special language. Retrospectively,theformerdesireforsafetyandwell-being which became apparent in the letters is replacedbythelanguageoftheregime-camaraderie and front solidarity. Nevertheless, at the same time Arnold discovers that due to experienced fear of death, for instance, there are layers in the individual memory which are resistant against those manipulating approaches of state-heroismandwhichappeartothemintheir dreams.
During the 20 th century the Soviet Union's or Russia's official policy of remembrance in regardtothecrimesofStalinismandtheCommunist Party passed through several quite differentphases:underKhrushchev'sandBrezhnev's reigning periods of de-and re-Stalinization alternated. The resolution from October 8 th 1959, regarding the history lessons at schools gives some interesting information on the policy of remembrance of those days. Although the teachers are asked to separate Stalin's regime fromthetraditionandhistoricalfunctionofthe communist party, the fundamental idea and principleofhistoriography,narodnost,remained untouched. Rather, history lessons at schools anduniversitiesshouldmaintaintheroleofthe masses as the true creators of history and the CommunistPartyastheleading,controllingand directingpowerofsovietsociety.Aprocommunist approach at the beginning of glasnost and perestroikawithemphasisondemonizingStalin for the sake of the communist movement was removed by an anticommunist, one which resulted in the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Nowadays,however,acriticalapproachtoRussia'spasthasbeenreplacedbya"patrioticconsensus" (Sperling, 2001 ) that expresses a new -orold-Russianconceptofidentityrely-ingon the idea of narodnost. The supposed glorious times of Russia and the Soviet Union -such as the pre-Revolutionary times of the tsar empire, the social, scientific and cultural achie-vements of Communism and, of course, the "Great Fatherland War" -serve as a fix-point of orientation for a better future. For this purpose, thepoliticalinstrumentalizationofWWIIiscrucial, because the official interpretation should provide those values which are supposed to helpinachievingthisbetterfutureofapowerful Russia which includes obedience, belief in the political leader (Putin-cult), social and political cohesion, feeling of togetherness, the glorious nation etc. This one-dimensional interpretation ofWWII-byplayingdownthehistoricalimpact and moral dimension of the Gulag -is implementedbyapolicyofremembrance:theaccess to archives is possible only to a very limited degree, the design of school books is in accordancewithpoliticalinterests,majorpartsofthe press are controlled by government and other possibleactorsinthefieldofapolicyofremembrance trying to draw another, a different pictureofhistory-suchastheSocietyMemorial 4 -suffertremendouslyfromstateop-pression.
Among the effectiveness of hero myth, Dan Diner puts emphasis on another reason for misremembering the Gulag: For Diner the logic of individual memory is relevant to a lesser extent;ratherhepointstothepreconditionswhich are necessary to constitute something like a common memory of a group. Following Halbwachs,Dinermaintainstheconnectionbetween memory and the self-perception as a group of people.Seeingfromthisperspectiveitiscrucial thatdealingwiththeGulagprimarilyresultsina critique of Stalin's regime; while in contrast, in the case of the Holocaust the German nation is the central point of reference: For Nazi-Germany,regimeandnationcoincide.Therefore,one could speak of the Nazi crimes as German crimes and the holocaust is classified as genocide done by the German nation. By con-trast, the crimes of Stalinism, as Diner puts it, are classified as crimes by the regime against the own population. Since Stalin's coming to power the SovietUnionhasbeenacommunityofperpetrators and victims, and, additionally, this relation 4 The Society Memorial is a Russian non-governmental human rights organizations and it is one of the most important agents in the field of memory and remembrance. Memorial was founded by Andrei Sacharow in 1988. becomes more complex since the perpetrators oftodaybecamethevictimsoftomorrow-and the other way round: In the course of Stalin's periodical purges those parts of party officers often were eliminated who had been responsible for the elimination of others before (Diner, 1995) . Moreover, reports from the camps expose that one cannot speak of unconditional solidarity among the camp's prisoner at all. Those women who were accused for sedition quite often became victims of rape and sexual abusebyothercamp'sprisoners (Lewin,2001) .
AnotheraspectisthefactthatthejustificationofthemasscrimesofStalinismaregivenon social ground. Certain groups, such as Kulaks, Trotskyist, critical intelligenzija etc. were destroyed due to their social position. In contrast, theNazisannihilatedpeoplelikeJews,Slavs,SintiandRomaniesonracialground.AsanAryan -and under the precondition of not opp-osing theregime-onecouldfeelsafe.InStalinismpure arbitrarinessruledunderwhichnotevenStalin himself could feel safe. For the Stal-inist terror, therefore, one can say that no specific group of victims faces a definite nameable group of perpetrators. For Diner, this kind of internal regime crimes asks for a complete other discourseofremembrancethanincaseofacommunity is accused for mass crimes by another one (Diner,1995) .Accordingly,thedivergentremembranceoftheShoahandtheGulagpointtothe high significance of questions like whoisremembering, what kind of events are remembered and in which tradition of commemoration the communityisembedded,forestablishingacertainhistoricalnarrativeattherootsthepolitical community (Diner, 1996) political com-munity (Diner, 1996) Today, however, this set-ting of remembranceseemstochange.AfterthebreakdownoftheSovietUnionseveralcountrieslike Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic states, etc. try to establishtheremembrancesofthecrimesofthe SovietUnionasonepillaroftheirnewnational self-understanding and use it to build up their nationalidentity.Itseemsobviousthatinthese countriesthenationalizationorethnicizationof theremembranceoftheGulagchallengetheRussian approach to establish WWII as a normative fix point in Russian history. Aga-in, this showshowGulagandWWIIaredirectlybound togetherintheculturalmemoryofRussia.
VI.Conclusion
Inconclusion,Idrewaveryroughpictureof thesettingoftheculturalmemoryofRussiaand oftheagentsandmultipliersinfluencingit.One cannotdenythatcomparedtoStalinismtheoccupation of memory eased during Khruschev's andBrezhnev'sreigns,theintensityofterrordecreased and that this gave rise to the old Russian tradition of samizdat -as an alternative to theofficialmemory (Hosking,1989) .TheSamizdat not only was the basis for Memorial, it also reveals that there is another Russian tradition andculturemaintainingdiscourse,disagrement and free speech in Russian terms -and not in Westerntermsperse-buriedorhalf-buriedby state-authoritiesduringdecades.Memorialknowsthattellinganotherstoryandgivingrealmto other stories of those years during WWII not onlyisahistoriographicalbutalsoademocratic project.
At the beginning of my paper I referred to Solzhenitsyn and the first part of the Russian proverb. I said that it characterizes the way of Russian'sdealingwiththepast.Inalmostthesamemannerthesecondandlastpartoftheproverb fits with the consequences emerging form suchawayofdealingwiththepast;becausethe proverb goes on to say: "Forget the past and you'll lose both eyes" (Solzhenitsyn, 1985, pp. xvi) .
